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INTRODUCTION

When a court announces a new rule of constitutional criminal
procedure, one question immediately follows: does the new rule
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apply to litigants negatively affected by the “old rule?” For the past
two hundred years, the answer to this question was simple and
2
straightforward—yes. In 1965, however, the U.S. Supreme Court
abandoned the traditional analysis and adopted a case-by-case
3
approach for determining the retroactivity of new rules of
4
constitutional criminal procedure. In the 1989 case of Teague v.
Lane, the Court revisited the doctrine of retroactivity and
announced that new rules of constitutional criminal procedure
5
would, as a general rule, not apply retroactively.
Although the Teague rule was specifically designed for, and
limited to, cases on federal habeas review, a few states, including
Minnesota, incorrectly interpreted Teague as binding on state
6
courts in state post-conviction proceedings. In 2006, Stephen
1. See Mary C. Hutton, Retroactivity in the States: The Impact of Teague v. Lane
on State Postconviction Remedies, 44 ALA. L. REV. 421, 421–22 (1993) (discussing the
implications of new rules). “The question of retroactivity is what to do when the
law changes. More precisely, it is to whom the new law should be applied, and to
whom the old.” Kermit Roosevelt III, A Little Theory is a Dangerous Thing: The Myth
of Adjudicative Retroactivity, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1075, 1075 (1999). See generally 21
C.J.S. Courts § 204 (2009) (providing a brief overview of the American retroactivity
doctrine); S. R. Shapiro, Annotation, Prospective or Retroactive Operation of Overruling
Decision, 10 A.L.R.3d 1371 (1966) (providing a detailed overview of the American
retroactivity doctrine in both criminal and civil applications).
2. Matthew R. Doherty, Note, The Reluctance Towards Retroactivity: The
Retroactive Application of Laws in Death Penalty Collateral Review Cases, 39 VAL. U. L.
REV. 445, 450–52 (2004) (discussing the common law approach to retroactivity).
3. “A decision is retro[active] if it applies to causes of action accruing before
the decision.” 21 C.J.S. Courts § 204 (2009).
A ruling that does not apply even to the parties before the court in the
case in which the ruling is issued is purely prospective. A decision has
limited prospective effect if the rule announced applies retroactively to
the parties before the court and also to those litigants whose claims were
pending at the time of the decision announcing the new rule, but
prospectively to all others.
Id.(footnotes omitted).
For a detailed discussion of relevant definitions,
specifically in the context of criminal procedure, see State v. Baird, 654 N.W.2d
105, 111 n.5 (Minn. 2002).
4. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965).
5. 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989).
6. Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1042 n.17 (2008). As Justice
Stevens emphasized in Danforth, Teague was decided under the federal habeas
statute and, therefore, is not binding on state courts. Id.
It is . . . abundantly clear that the Teague rule of nonretroactivity was
fashioned to achieve the goals of federal habeas while minimizing federal
intrusion into state criminal proceedings. It was intended to limit the
authority of federal courts to overturn state convictions—not to limit a
state court’s authority to grant relief for violations of new rules of
constitutional law when reviewing its own State’s convictions.
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Danforth, seeking post-conviction relief, urged the Minnesota
Supreme Court to abandon the Teague test and adopt an alternative
7
approach. The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected Danforth’s
argument, holding that it was required to follow Teague’s
8
The U.S. Supreme Court sided with
retroactivity standard.
Danforth and reversed and remanded, holding that states were free
to develop their own retroactivity approaches for state post9
conviction proceedings. On remand, the Minnesota Supreme
Court again rejected Danforth’s arguments and decided to retain
the Teague retroactivity approach for state post-conviction
10
Thus, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided to
proceedings.
formally adopt a retroactivity standard that was not designed for
11
state post-conviction application.
This note first traces the history of the federal retroactivity
doctrine, from the English common law to the U.S. Supreme
12
Court’s latest decision in Danforth. Next, this note discusses the
history and development of the retroactivity doctrine in the State of
13
14
Minnesota. Then, this note discusses the facts and holding and
provides an analysis of the Minnesota Supreme Court’s final
15
decision in Danforth v. State. This note goes on to suggest that the
Minnesota Supreme Court should accept the Supreme Court’s
invitation to develop a retroactivity standard that is responsive to
16
the goals and purpose of Minnesota’s post-conviction proceedings
and provides a number of alternatives that can be adopted in
17
Teague’s place. Finally, this note concludes that the Minnesota
Supreme Court should adopt a modified, broader version of the
Teague retroactivity standard because it will best serve the goals and
18
purpose of state post-conviction review.
Id. at 1041. The Court also noted that following Teague, the majority of state courts
interpreted Teague as binding only on federal habeas courts. Id. at 1042.
Minnesota is one of only three states that interpreted Teague as binding on state
courts. Id. n.17.
7. Danforth v. State, 761 N.W.2d 493, 495 (Minn. 2009).
8. Id. at 494.
9. Danforth, 128 S. Ct. at 1041–42.
10. Danforth, 761 N.W.2d at 494.
11. See Danforth, 128 S. Ct. at 1041.
12. See infra Part II.A.
13. See infra Part II.B.
14. See infra Part III.
15. See infra Part IV.
16. See infra Part IV.A.
17. See infra Part IV.B.
18. See infra Parts IV.C and V.
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II. HISTORY
A. Development and History of the Federal Retroactivity Doctrine
1.

Retroactivity at Common Law

The origins of retroactivity and its basic principles can be
19
Under common law,
traced back to the English common law.
newly announced rules were applied retroactively to all subsequent
cases, without distinguishing between cases on direct and collateral
20
As Professor LaFave points out in his treatise, “At
review.
common law there was no authority supporting the proposition
21
that judicial decisions made law only for the future.”
The common law approach to retroactivity was based on
22
Blackstone’s declaratory theory of law, stating that “the duty of
the court was not to ‘pronounce a new law, but to maintain and
23
expound the old one.’” Under this approach, the judge does not
create new law, but rather “discover[s] what the true law is and . . .
24
expose[s] the misinterpretation that formerly governed.”
Because courts did not create the law but merely discovered it, a
court’s overruling of a prior decision was simply viewed as a
25
correction of a prior misunderstanding of the law. Accordingly,
the overruled decision was never the law, and the newly announced
26
rule, having been the law all along, must be applied retroactively.
27
The U.S. Supreme Court adopted this approach, and, until
19. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622 (1965). The Linkletter Court
began its analysis by reviewing the history of retroactivity, noting that “[w]hile to
some it may seem ‘academic’ it might be helpful to others . . . .” Id.
20. Doherty, supra note 2, at 450 (discussing retroactivity at common law); see
also Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 622 (“At common law there was no authority for the
proposition that judicial decisions made law only for the future.”); Kuhn v.
Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“Judicial
decisions have had retrospective operation for near a thousand years.”).
21. 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 11.5 (4th ed. 2008).
22. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 623 n.7 (“While Blackstone is always cited as the
foremost exponent of the declaratory theory, a very similar view was stated by Sir
Matthew Hale in his History of the Common Law which was published 13 years
before the birth of Blackstone.”).
23. Id. at 622–23 (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 69 (15th ed. 1809)).
24. Hutton, supra note 1, at 425 (discussing Blackstone’s theory of law).
25. See id. (discussing Blackstone’s theory of law).
26. See id. (“In accordance with this theory, any ‘new rule’ has to be applied
retroactively because it represents what the law has been all along.”).
27. See Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1036 (2008) (“[U]ntil 1965
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1965, new rules of constitutional criminal procedure were
consistently applied to all cases coming before the Court on habeas
28
review. As one commentator noted, “[t]here was no question of
which laws should be retroactive, or whom they would be
29
retroactive to, because the law was always applied retroactively.”
In his article attacking the Linkletter decision, Professor James
Haddad correctly pointed out that prior to 1965, “the Court’s
practice always had been to apply new constitutional decisions
retroactively and never did a majority opinion even consider that
30
something less would be permissible.” Even the Linkletter court
admitted that “[i]t is true that heretofore, without discussion, we
have applied new constitutional rules to cases finalized before the
31
As such, the common law
promulgation of the [new] rule.”
approach to retroactivity was relatively straight-forward and
provided courts with a bright-line, easily applicable rule of
32
automatic retroactivity.
By 1965, however, the legal realism movement, based on John
33
Austin’s theory of law, had emerged and was gaining popularity
the Court continued to construe every constitutional error, including newly
announced ones, as entitling state prisoners to relief on federal habeas.”);
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622 (1965). (“The Blackstonian view ruled
English jurisprudence and cast its shadow over our own . . . .”).
28. Danforth, 128 S. Ct. at 1036 (Until 1965, “‘[n]ew’ constitutional rules of
criminal procedure were, without discussion or analysis, routinely applied to cases
on habeas review.”); see also LAFAVE, supra note 21, § 11.5 (“This common law
position took hold in this country, so that it was generally assumed that all judicial
decisions were fully retroactive.”); Ann N. Bosse, Retroactivity and the Supreme Court,
41 MD. B.J. 30, 30 (2008) (“Until . . . 1965, new rules of criminal procedure were
routinely applied to all cases - past, present, and to come.”).
29. Doherty, supra note 2, at 451 (discussing retroactivity at common law).
30. James B. Haddad, “Retroactivity Should Be Rethought”: A Call for the End of
the Linkletter Doctrine, 60 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 417, 425 (1969).
31. Linkletter 381 U.S. at 628. Prior to 1965, “the thought that a decision of
the United States Supreme Court declarative of constitutional rights might be
nonretroactive was never seriously entertained.” LAFAVE, supra note 21, § 11.5.
32. See Doherty, supra note 2, at 451 (discussing retroactivity at common law).
At common law, “questions of retroactivity were easy, indeed, invisible.” Roosevelt,
supra note 1, at 1077–78 (discussing retroactivity at common law). As some
commentators argue, the Court’s rejection of the common law automatic
retroactivity doctrine during the last half of the twentieth century has created
confusion and inconsistency. See Christopher S. Strauss, Comment, Collateral
Damage: How the Supreme Court’s Retroactivity Doctrine Affects Federal Drug Prisoners’
Apprendi Claims on Collateral Review, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1220, 1222 (2003) (discussing
the Court’s current retroactivity doctrine and stating that over the past thirty-six
years, the Court has been struggling with a retroactivity doctrine that is
“theoretically incoherent” and “difficult to apply”).
33. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 624 (discussing Austin’s theory of law); see also
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34

among scholars and practitioners. Austin argued that “judges do
in fact do something more than discover law; they make it
interstitially by filling in with judicial interpretation the vague,
indefinite, or generic statutory or common-law terms that alone are
35
but the empty crevices of the law.” Under this theory, overruled
decisions are considered valid law until overruled, and newly
announced rules of law do not apply retroactively to decisions
36
made final prior to the announcement of the new rule.
Relying on the theory of legal realism, some scholars
37
Critics
challenged the common law approach to retroactivity.
argued that the common law approach was “out of tune with
actuality” because judicial repeal of what was thought to be the law
could often “work hardship to those who had trusted to its
38
As for the members of the Court, Justice Frankfurter
existence.”
was the first to suggest, in 1956, that new rules of constitutional
39
criminal procedure should not be applied retroactively.
40
Concurring in Griffin v. Illinois, Justice Frankfurter argued that
the “law generally speaks prospectively. . . . We should not indulge
in the fiction that the law now announced has always been the
law . . . . It is much more conducive to law’s self-respect to
recognize candidly the considerations that give prospective content
41
Similarly, in 1958, Justices
to a new pronouncement of law.”
Harlan and Whittaker renewed Justice Frankfurter’s proposal and
urged the Court to adopt a prospective-only application of the rule
42
announced in Griffin. In Eskridge v. Washington State Board of Prison
43
Terms and Paroles, Justices Harlan and Whittaker argued that
Griffin, decided in 1956, should not be applied retroactively to a
44
defendant convicted in 1935.
Charles Leonard Scalise, A Clear Break from the Clear Break Exception of Retroactivity
Analysis: Griffith v. Kentucky, 73 IOWA L. REV. 473, 476-77 (1988) (discussing
Austin’s theory of law and its gaining popularity).
34. See Doherty, supra note 2, at 451 (discussing retroactivity at common law).
See also Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 624 (discussing cases applying Austin’s theory of legal
realism).
35. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 623–24.
36. Id. at 624.
37. LAFAVE, supra note 21, § 11.5.
38. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 624 (quotations omitted).
39. Haddad, supra note 30, at 420.
40. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
41. Id. at 26 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
42. Haddad, supra note 30, at 420.
43. 357 U.S. 214 (1958).
44. Id. at 216 (Harlan, J. & Whittaker. J., dissenting).
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Five years later, in Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, Justice Harlan
46
once again voiced his discontent with automatic retroactivity. In a
brief, two-sentence per curiam opinion, the Pickelsimer Court
remanded ten Florida cases for reconsideration in light of Gideon v.
47
Wainwright. Dissatisfied with the Court’s “summary disposition” of
ten Florida cases, Justice Harlan urged the Court to “deal
definitively with th[e] important and far-reaching subject” of
48
As these examples demonstrate, by 1965,
retroactivity.
Blackstone’s legal principles, the driving force behind American
retroactivity jurisprudence, were under attack by supporters of
49
Austin’s legal realism.
2.

Automatic Retroactivity Abandoned: Linkletter v. Walker
50

In the 1965 decision of Linkletter v. Walker, the U.S. Supreme
Court “expressly [addressed] the issue of retroactivity for the first
51
time.” As Justice Clark explained in the first paragraph of the
Court’s opinion, the Court granted certiorari to resolve “what has
become a most troublesome question in the administration of
52
justice.” The issue in Linkletter was whether the exclusionary rule
53
announced in the landmark decision of Mapp v. Ohio applied
54
retroactively to cases finally decided prior to Mapp. As the Court
noted, “A split of authority ha[d] developed in the various courts of
55
appeals concerning the retrospectivity of Mapp.” Citing a long
45. 375 U.S. 2 (1963).
46. Id. at 3 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 2–3.
48. Id. at 3–4 (Harlan, J., dissenting). “[I]t seems to me that the question
whether the States are constitutionally required to apply the new rule
retrospectively, which may well require the reopening of cases long since finally
adjudicated . . . is one that should be decided only after informed and deliberate
consideration.” Id. at 3. “Surely no general answer is to be found in ‘the fiction
that the law now announced has always been the law.’” Id. (quoting Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 26 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
49. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 623–24 (1965). By 1965, Austin’s
theory of legal realism had also been recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court and a
number of state courts. Francis X. Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity: A Critique
and a Proposal, 61 VA. L. REV. 1557, 1560 (1975) (discussing growing judicial
support of Austin’s legal realism).
50. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 618.
51. Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1036 (2008).
52. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 620.
53. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Mapp held that the exclusionary rule was binding
on state courts as a remedy for Fourth Amendment violations. Id. at 655.
54. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 619-20.
55. Id. at 620 n.2.
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list of conflicting cases, the Court stated that, “About the only point
upon which there was agreement in the cases cited was that our
opinion in Mapp did not foreclose the question” of retroactivity of
56
Mapp.
The “prospect of upsetting ‘thousands’ of final state court
convictions in order to apply the exclusionary rule was too much,”
forcing the Linkletter court to abandon “centuries of adherence to a
57
strict rule of retroactivity.” Ensuring that Mapp would not apply
58
retroactively, Linkletter held that the retroactivity of new rules of
constitutional criminal procedure should be determined on a case59
by-case basis under a three-part test. As the Court explained, the
retroactivity of new rules would be determined by weighing “the
merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of
the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether
60
retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.”
Thus, Linkletter abandoned the historic rule of automatic
61
and adopted the modern doctrine of
retroactivity
62
In other words, new rules of constitutional
“prospectivity.”
criminal procedure would no longer enjoy automatic retroactive
63
effect.
The Linkletter decision was immediately criticized for its
64
practical and theoretic shortcomings. The first attack came from
56. Id.
57. Christopher N. Lasch, The Future of Teague Retroactivity, or “Redressability,”
After Danforth v. Minnesota: Why Lower Courts Should Give Retroactive Effect to New
Constitutional Rules of Criminal Procedure in Postconviction Proceedings, 46 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1, 11 (2009) (discussing the Linkletter decision).
58. Id. at 12. If applied retroactively, Mapp would overburden state criminal
justice systems: “Hearings would have to be held in large numbers. Guilty men
would go free either because the States did not have the resources to carry the
defense against claims of unlawful seizures to a successful conclusion or because
essential evidence had been unlawfully seized and offered at trial.” Haddad, supra
note 30, at 422 (discussing the Mapp decision).
59. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629.
60. Id.
61. Lasch, supra note 57, at 11.
62. Leslie Capace Auberger, Note, Blakely v. Washington and the Retroactivity
Question, 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 655, 662 (2006). “It . . . appears that the prospective-only
technique . . . is a permanent fixture . . . .” Haddad, supra note 30, at 419.
63. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629.
64. See Lasch, supra note 57, at 12–24 (discussing various critiques of the
Linkletter decision). “[C]ommentators have ‘had a veritable field day’ with the
Linkletter standard, with much of the discussion being ‘more than mildly
negative.’” Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 303 (1989) (citing Beytagh, supra note
49, at 1558) (quotations omitted).
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65

Justice Black, the author of the dissenting opinion in Linkletter.
Justice Black argued that the Mapp rule should be applied
retroactively to Linkletter and others similarly situated while they
are “languishing in jail” as a result of evidence used
66
Justice Black began his
unconstitutionally to convict them.
critique of the Court’s decision by pointing out that, even though
Linkletter’s offense was committed after that of Mapp, Linkletter’s
67
conviction was affirmed while Mapp was set free. Dissatisfied with
such a result, dictated only by the difference in timing between the
68
two cases, Justice Black proclaimed that the Court’s decision in
69
Linkletter was “arbitrary and discriminatory.”
In addition to his dissatisfaction with the Court’s disparate
treatment of similarly situated defendants, Justice Black was also
concerned that the Linkletter court was pushing its constitutional
70
limits by venturing into the sphere of legislative lawmaking. As
Justice Black explained, by announcing prospective-only rules of
constitutional criminal procedure, the Court was making law rather
71
The criticism of the Court’s decision in
than interpreting it.
72
Linkletter decision did not end with Justice Black’s dissent.
Professor Mishkin, an often-cited commentator in the field,
criticized Linkletter for abandoning Blackstonian theoretic
73
principles. Mishkin believed that Blackstone’s declaratory theory
65. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 640 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black was also
joined in his dissent by Justice Douglas. Id.
66. Id. at 645 (Black, J., dissenting).
67. See id. at 641. Mapp committed her offense on May 23, 1957; Linkletter
committed his offense more than a year later, on August 16, 1958. Id. Mapp’s
conviction became final on March 23, 1960, almost three years after her offense
was committed; Linkletter’s conviction became final on March 21, 1960, about
one year and seven months after his offense was committed. Id.
68. Justice Black criticized the Court for “perpetrat[ing] a grossly invidious
and unfair discrimination against Linkletter simply because he happened to be
prosecuted in a State that was evidently well up with its criminal court docket.” Id.
at 642. As Justice Black explained, Linkletter’s conviction became final prior to
the decision in Mapp simply because Louisiana’s appellate procedure was faster
than that of Ohio. Id. at 641. Had Louisiana’s appellate procedure been slower,
or Ohio’s faster, Linkletter’s conviction would not be “final” prior to Mapp, and
Linkletter would be afforded the benefit of the exclusionary rule on direct review.
Id. “The Court offers no defense based on any known principle of justice for
discriminating among defendants who were similarly convicted by use of evidence
unconstitutionally seized.” Id.
69. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965).
70. Id. at 644.
71. Id.
72. See infra notes 75–97 and accompanying text.
73. Paul J. Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process
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played a “symbolic role” in American jurisprudence and was
74
necessary to uphold the “prestige and power” of American courts.
Mishkin also argued that the Linkletter decision would not only
discourage attorneys from advocating on behalf of their clients by
presenting novel legal theories, but would also interfere with the
courts’ abilities to replace “unsound or outmoded legal
75
doctrines.”
Professor Haddad, another legal scholar, also attacked the
Court’s decision in Linkletter, arguing that the Linkletter retroactivity
76
approach should be abandoned. Haddad criticized the Court for
applying the new retroactivity approach to the rule announced in
77
Mapp but not to those announced in Gideon and Griffin. Haddad
especially criticized the Linkletter majority for its lack of and misuse
78
of precedent. As Haddad explained, there were multiple cases
decided prior to Linkletter where the Court applied new
79
Additionally, there were
constitutional rights retroactively.
multiple instances where the Court invoked the common law
automatic retroactivity doctrine to cases finally decided prior to the

of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 65 (1965) (discussing Linkletter’s
abandonment of Blackstone’s declaratory theory of law).
74. Id. at 62–63 (discussing the symbolic significance of Blackstone’s theory
of law). “[T]he ‘declaratory theory’ expresses a symbolic concept of the judicial
process on which much of courts’ prestige and power depend.” Id. at 62. “This is
the strongly held and deeply felt belief that judges are bound by a body of fixed,
overriding law, that they apply that law impersonally as well as impartially, that
they exercise no individual choice and have no program of their own to advance.”
Id. “If the view be in part myth, it is a myth by which we live and which can be
sacrificed only at substantial cost.” Id. at 62–63. While professor Mishkin
criticized the Court’s rejection of Blackstone’s declaratory theory of law, he
nonetheless agreed with the ultimate result reached by the Court in Linkletter. Id.
at 102 (“The Linkletter result . . . seems quite sound--indeed, in part for reasons
which its rationale tends to obscure.”).
75. Id. at 60–61 (discussing the effects of prospective judicial lawmaking).
“When a new rule of law is given purely prospective effect, it . . . does not
determine the judgment awarded in the case in which it is announced. It follows
that if parties anticipate such a prospective limitation, they will have no stimulus to
argue for change in the law.”
Id. “[T]he recognition of even a substantial possibility of such limitation will tend
to deter counsel from advancing contentions involving novelty or ingenuity and
will lead them to focus on other aspects of their cases.” Id. at 61.
76. Haddad, supra note 30, at 440–41 (concluding that prospective-only
application of new rules of constitutional criminal procedure should be
“banished”).
77. Haddad, supra note 30, at 423.
78. Haddad, supra note 30, at 425.
79. Id.
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80

announcement of the new rule. Lastly, like Justice Black, Haddad
was also dissatisfied with the Court’s disparate treatment of
81
For these and other reasons,
similarly situated defendants.
Haddad concluded that the Linkletter retroactivity approach
82
“should be banished.”
Unpersuaded by the sharp criticism, the U.S. Supreme Court
83
continued to expand the Linkletter rule in Johnson v. New Jersey and
84
In Johnson, the Court held that the rules
Stovall v. Denno.
85
86
announced in Escobedo v. Illinois and Miranda v. Arizona would
87
not be applied retroactively. In Stovall, the Court held that the
Linkletter rule would apply not only to cases on collateral review but
88
also to cases pending on direct review. Thus, the Court continued
to apply and expand the Linkletter rule in other important criminal
89
procedure decisions throughout the 1960s.
As the Court noted in Danforth, “application of the Linkletter
90
standard produced strikingly divergent results.” A few years after
the Court’s decision in Stovall, Justice Harlan responded to these
inconsistencies and attacked the Linkletter approach through his
91
dissenting opinion in Desist v. United States and concurring
92
opinion in Mackey v. United States. Justice Harlan argued that in a
short period of time, the Linkletter approach generated a large

Id.

80. Id.
Many of these decisions represented conscious rejections of suggestions
that a prospective-only doctrine be recognized in the area of
constitutional criminal procedure. The fact that such suggestions were
not deemed worthy of comment by any majority opinion weighs heavily
against a suggestion that the Court believed that prospective-only
treatment could be accorded some constitutionally required procedural
safeguards but not the one involved in the particular case before the
Court.

81. Id. at 438 (“There is something offensive about the notion that the
Supreme Court of the United States, like the sometimes-just, sometimes-generous
vineyard owner, can bestow its favors upon whomever it pleases.”).
82. Id. at 441.
83. 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
84. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
85. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
86. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
87. Johnson, 384 U.S. at 721.
88. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 300–01.
89. See Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1037 n.8 (2008).
90. Id. at 1037.
91. 394 U.S. 244, 256 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
92. 401 U.S. 667, 675 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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number of “incompatible rules and inconsistent principles.”
Justice Harlan further proclaimed that the Linkletter approach had
94
created “doctrinal confusion” and “must be rethought.” Despite
the criticism, the Court continued to apply the Linkletter
95
retroactivity approach for another twenty years.
3. Retroactivity “Rethought”: Griffith v. Kentucky and Teague v.
Lane
96

In the 1987 decision of Griffith v. Kentucky, the Court finally
started to “rethink” the Linkletter approach, as was urged by Justice
97
Griffith rejected the Linkletter
Harlan in Desist and Mackey.
retroactivity rule for cases on direct review and held that new rules
of constitutional criminal procedure would apply retroactively to all
98
cases pending on direct review or not yet final.
99
Two years later, in Teague v. Lane, the Court reaffirmed
Griffith and completely rejected the Linkletter approach to
100
101
Under Teague, new rules
of constitutional
retroactivity.
criminal procedure would not apply retroactively to cases on
collateral review unless the case falls under one of two exceptions:
(1) when the new rule places certain kinds of conduct “beyond the
power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe . . . .” and
(2) when the new rule is a “watershed” rule of criminal procedure
without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction would
102
As such, Teague established a new
seriously be diminished.
standard for determining whether new rules of constitutional
criminal procedure apply retroactively.

93. Desist, 394 U.S. at 258 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
94. Id.
95. Bosse, supra note 28, at 31.
96. 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
97. 401 U.S. at 676–77 (Harlan, J., concurring); 394 U.S. at 258 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
98. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 328.
99. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
100. Id. at 311–13. Although Teague was a plurality opinion, it was quickly
adopted by the majority of the Court in Penry v. Lynbaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 305
(1989).
101. A “new rule” is one that “breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation
on the States or the Federal Government.” Teague, 489 U.S. at 301. In other words,
“a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at
the time the defendant’s conviction became final.” Id.
102. Id. at 311–12.
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The Court’s Final Word: Danforth v. Minnesota

The latest development in the retroactivity jurisprudence was
Danforth v. Minnesota, where the Court was asked to determine
whether Teague is binding on state courts in post-conviction
103
As the Court noted, neither Linkletter nor Teague
proceedings.
constricted the states from developing and adopting a broader
104
retroactivity approach for state post-conviction proceedings.
Furthermore, Teague was not developed to further state goals, but
rather to address the goals of federal habeas review and minimize
105
As Danforth
federal interference in state criminal convictions.
concluded, Teague “does not in any way limit the authority of a state
court, when reviewing its own state criminal convictions, to provide
a remedy for a violation that is deemed ‘nonretroactive’ under
106
Teague.” Thus, states are now free to develop their own approach
for determining the retroactivity of new rules of constitutional
107
criminal procedure.
B. Development and History of Minnesota’s Retroactivity Doctrine
In Danforth v. State, the Minnesota Supreme Court provided a
brief overview of the history and development of Minnesota’s
108
There, the supreme court traced
retroactivity doctrine.
Minnesota’s retroactivity jurisprudence to its 1977 decision of State
109
However, an even earlier Minnesota case discussing the
v. Olsen.
retroactivity of new rules of constitutional criminal procedure in
103. Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029 (2008). Although a majority of
states did not interpret Teague as binding on state courts, three states, Minnesota,
Oregon, and Montana, were under the impression that Teague was binding on
state courts. Id. at 1042 n.17.
104. Id. at 1038. “A close reading of the Teague opinion makes clear that the
rule it established was tailored to the unique context of federal habeas and
therefore had no bearing on whether States could provide broader relief in their
own postconviction proceedings than required by that opinion.” Id. at 1039. The
Court also noted that because Teague was a statutory decision interpreting a
federal statute, it cannot be read as binding on state courts. Id. at 1040.
105. Id. at 1041.
106. Id. at 1042.
107. Lasch, supra note 57, at 43. As the Court noted in Danforth, the majority
of states have recognized that Teague was not binding on state postconviction
proceedings. 128 S. Ct. at 1042. However, most states continue to apply the
Teague approach “out of convenience.” Lasch, supra note 57, at 42.
108. 761 N.W.2d 493, 495–97 (Minn. 2009).
109. Id. at 496 (referring to State v. Olsen, 258 N.W.2d 898, 907 n.15 (Minn.
1977)).
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some detail is the court’s 1965 decision of State v. Richter.
The issue before the court in Richter was whether Mapp,
decided in 1961, applied retroactively to a 1951 conviction
111
Anticipating the U.S. Supreme
obtained through a guilty plea.
112
Court’s decision on the retroactivity of Mapp, the Richter court
113
appeared hesitant to issue an opinion on the matter.
Nonetheless, the court provided a thorough analysis, expressly
rejecting Blackstone’s declaratory theory of law and stating that the
retroactivity of Mapp would be decided based on public policy
114
As the court explained, “we do not subscribe to
considerations.
115
the philosophy that Mapp was the law in 1951.” The Richter court
also distinguished Mapp from the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions
in Griffin and Gideon, explaining that the new rules announced in
those cases are applied retroactively because they have a direct
impact on the reliability of a defendant’s trial and on the
116
determination of his innocence or guilt.
The exclusionary rule announced in Mapp, on the other hand,
does not affect the reliability of the defendant’s trial and was
designed primarily for the purpose of deterring police
117
Writing that retroactive application of Mapp would
misconduct.
disturb a reliably obtained conviction and have no deterrent effect
on police misconduct, the Richter court concluded that Mapp would
118
not be applied retroactively in that case.
110. 270 Minn. 307, 133 N.W.2d 537 (1965).
111. Id. at 307–08, 133 N.W.2d at 537–38.
112. Id. at 310, 133 N.W.2d at 539. Decided in February of 1965, the Richter
court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court had granted certiorari in Linkletter v.
Walker. Id. at 310, 133 N.W.2d at 539. The Court decided Linkletter v. Walker less
than four months later, in June of 1965. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
113. Richter, 270 Minn. at 310, 133 N.W.2d at 539 (“So much has been written
on the retroactivity of Mapp we hesitate to further burden the bench and bar with
protracted speculation on how that question will ultimately be resolved.”). The
court nonetheless went on to provide a detailed, in-depth analysis of the
retroactivity of Mapp. See id. at 311–17, 133 N.W.2d at 540–43.
114. Id. at 312–13, 133 N.W.2d at 540–41. “[W]e do not feel compelled to
adopt the views expressed by Blackstone in his Commentaries concerning the
effect of overruling previous decisions. . . . [T]he application of the Mapp rule
must be determined by a consideration of broad public policy.” Id. at 312–13, 133
N.W.2d at 540–41.
115. Id. at 313, 133 N.W.2d at 541.
116. Id. at 315, 133 N.W.2d at 542.
117. Id. at 316, 133 N.W.2d at 542.
118. Id. at 316–17, 133 N.W.2d at 542–43. “[W]e do not feel moved to adopt a
rule which can not now have any deterrent effect, but would result only in
granting a belated trial to a prisoner who has confessed in open court the details
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During the period immediately following the Court’s decision
in Linkletter, the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed the issue of
retroactivity of new rules of constitutional criminal procedure a few
119
In State ex
times, although only summarily in a number of cases.
rel. Rasmussen v. Tahash, the court addressed the retroactivity of
120
Escobedo v. Illinois in some detail. Relying, among other cases, on
Linkletter and Richter, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that
Escobedo would not apply retroactively unless directed otherwise by
121
As in Richter, the court based its
the U.S. Supreme Court.
decision on the determination that Escobedo, unlike Gideon and
Griffin, does not play a role on the reliability of the defendant’s
122
In
conviction and, as such, should not be applied retroactively.
123
124
Bultman v. State and State ex rel. Boswell v. Tahash, the Minnesota
Supreme Court decided that, based on Linkletter, Mapp would not
be given retroactive effect.
While Linkletter was cited by the Minnesota Supreme Court in
125
the court did not formally adopt the
numerous decisions,
Linkletter retroactivity standard until its State v. Hamm decision in
126
In Hamm, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the
1988.
Minnesota Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a twelveperson jury in misdemeanor prosecutions and struck down a
fifteen-year-old statute, providing for a six-person jury, as
127
128
Next, citing State v. Olsen, the court formally
unconstitutional.
adopted the Linkletter-Stovall retroactivity standard and held that
129
the new twelve-person jury rule would not apply retroactively.
of the offense with which he was charged.” Id. at 316, 133 N.W.2d at 543.
119. See Bultman v. State, 290 Minn. 511, 513, 187 N.W.2d 117, 118 (1971)
(disposing of the retroactivity issue in one short paragraph); State ex rel. Boswell v.
Tahash, 278 Minn. 408, 417, 154 N.W.2d 813, 819 (1967) (disposing of the
retroactivity issue in one short paragraph).
120. 272 Minn. 539, 141 N.W.2d 3 (1966).
121. Id. at 546–47, 141 N.W.2d at 9.
122. Id. at 545–46, 141 N.W.2d at 8–9.
123. 290 Minn. 511, 513, 187 N.W.2d 117, 118 (1971).
124. 278 Minn. 408, 417, 154 N.W.2d 813, 819 (1967).
125. See supra notes 114–27 and accompanying text.
126. 423 N.W.2d 379, 386 (Minn. 1988).
127. Id. at 386.
128. 258 N.W.2d 898, 907 n.15 (Minn. 1977).
129. Hamm, 423 N.W.2d at 386. The court stated: “In . . . Olsen . . . we cited
with approval various United States Supreme Court cases which set forth a test for
determining whether a decision should be applied prospectively. We adopt the
criteria set forth in those cases and hold that the criteria have been met in this
case.” Id.
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Under the Linkletter-Stovall approach, courts would decide the
retroactivity of new rules of constitutional criminal procedure by
considering three factors: “(1) the purpose of the decision, (2)
reliance on the prior rule of law, and (3) the effect upon the
130
administration of justice of granting retroactive effect.”
As the court noted in Danforth, Minnesota courts continued to
131
follow the Linkletter-Stovall retroactivity approach until 2004. That
year, the Minnesota Supreme Court issued its decision in O’Meara
132
where the court abandoned the Linkletter-Stovall
v. State,
retroactivity approach and adopted the Teague retroactivity
133
The O’Meara court explained that it was
approach in its place.
“compelled to follow the lead of the Supreme Court in
determining” the retroactivity of new rules of federal constitutional
134
Finally, in its most recent decision of
criminal procedure.
Danforth v. State, the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the U.S.
Supreme Court’s invitation to abandon Teague and instead formally
adopted the Teague retroactivity standard for state post-conviction
135
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s final decision in
proceedings.
Danforth is described in detail below.
III. THE DANFORTH DECISION
In the summer of 1995, Stephen Danforth was charged with
first-degree criminal sexual conduct for allegedly molesting J.S., a
136
During a videotaped interview, J.S. stated that
six-year-old boy.
137
The videotape of the
he was sexually abused by Danforth.
interview was admitted into evidence, and the jury was allowed to
138
Danforth was subsequently found
watch the videotape at trial.
139
140
guilty, and his conviction was affirmed on appeal.
130. Danforth v. State, 761 N.W.2d 493, 495 (Minn. 2009).
131. Id. at 496.
132. 679 N.W.2d 334 (Minn. 2004).
133. Id. at 339–40.
134. Id. at 339.
135. Danforth, 761 N.W.2d at 500.
136. State v. Danforth, 573 N.W.2d 369, 372 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997). At the
time, Danforth was a convicted pedophile and a disbarred attorney. Id.
137. Id.
138. Danforth, 761 N.W.2d at 495.
139. Danforth, 573 N.W.2d at 372. Danforth was originally sentenced to 216
months imprisonment. Id.
140. Id. at 378. However, the Minnesota Court of Appeals remanded the case
for resentencing, and Danforth’s sentence was increased to 316 months
imprisonment on remand. Danforth v. State, 718 N.W.2d 451, 454 (Minn. 2006),
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In 2004, eight years after Danforth’s conviction, the U.S.
141
Supreme Court issued its decisions in Crawford v. Washington and
142
Following these holdings, Danforth filed a
Blakely v. Washington.
post-conviction petition, seeking relief under the new rules
143
Danforth’s petition was denied because, as
established therein.
the court found, Crawford and Blakely did not apply retroactively to
144
The court of appeals affirmed, and the
Danforth’s case.
Minnesota Supreme Court granted review solely on the Crawford
145
issue.
On review, Danforth argued that the supreme court is free to
apply a retroactivity standard broader than Teague, and that
146
Crawford applies to his case under state retroactivity principles.
Danforth also argued that Crawford applies to his case even under
147
the Teague retroactivity standard. The Minnesota Supreme Court
rejected Danforth’s arguments, holding that (1) it was required to
follow the Teague retroactivity standard, and (2) Crawford did not
148
Danforth
apply to Danforth’s case retroactively under Teague.
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted certiorari and
reversed and remanded. The Court held that state courts are not
required to follow Teague and may develop their own standards for
determining the retroactivity of new rules of federal constitutional
149
Danforth’s case then returned to the
criminal procedure.
150
Minnesota Supreme Court.
On remand, Danforth argued that the Teague standard should
be abandoned, and that the Minnesota Supreme Court should
151
approach or adopt Nevada’s
return to the Linkletter-Stovall
cert. granted in part, 550 U.S. 956 (2007), rev’d, 128 S. Ct. 1029 (2008).
141. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). Crawford held that, under the Confrontation Clause
of the U.S. Constitution, out-of-court testimonial statements made by a witness must
be excluded from evidence unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant
had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Id. at 59.
142. 542 U.S. 296 (2004). Blakely held that an upward departure from a
statutory maximum sentence, based on findings made by a judge rather than a
jury, is unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Id.
at 301–05.
143. Danforth, 718 N.W.2d at 455.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1046 (2008).
150. Danforth v. State, 761 N.W.2d 493 (Minn. 2009).
151. See supra notes 131–133 and accompanying text.
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152

Colwell
approach for deciding whether new rules of federal
153
The
constitutional criminal procedure apply retroactively.
Minnesota Supreme Court framed the issue on remand as “what
standard [it] should use to decide whether new rules of federal
154
constitutional criminal procedure will be applied retroactively.”
The Minnesota Supreme Court ultimately rejected Danforth’s
arguments and affirmed its prior decision, holding that Minnesota
will continue to use the Teague standard for deciding whether new
rules of constitutional criminal procedure apply retroactively to
155
state criminal convictions.
After reviewing the changes in Minnesota’s retroactivity
156
doctrine over the last half of the twentieth century, the supreme
157
The
court considered the policy concerns underlying Teague.
Danforth court first admitted that not all policy considerations
leading to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Teague necessarily
transfer to state courts addressing state post-conviction
158
As such, the Danforth court conceded that Teague’s
challenges.
concerns of interfering with state convictions do not play a role in
159
However, the Danforth court
state post-conviction proceedings.
stated that Teague’s second policy consideration, finality of state
convictions, is equally applicable to state post-conviction
160
Quoting Teague, the court highlighted the
proceedings.
importance of finality of state convictions: “Without finality, the
161
The
criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect.”
152. Colwell v. State, 59 P.3d 463, 471 (Nev. 2002). Colwell is a modified
version of the Teague retroactivity standard, which broadened Teague’s first
exception and eliminated the “watershed” rule requirement from Teague’s second
exception. Id. at 472.
153. Danforth, 761 N.W.2d at 498.
154. Id. at 495.
155. Id. at 500.
156. Id. at 495–96. The supreme court explained that until recently,
Minnesota followed the Linkletter-Stovall standard set out by the U.S. Supreme
Court. Id. at 495. In 2004, however, Minnesota abandoned Linkletter and adopted
the standard set out by the U.S. Supreme Court in Teague. Id. at 496. Since that
time, Minnesota has consistently followed the Teague retroactivity standard. Id. at
496–97.
157. Id. at 497–98.
158. See id. at 498 (“[W]e acknowledge that one of the policy concerns
underlying Teague-that federal habeas courts not excessively interfere with state
courts-is absent when a state court is reviewing state convictions”).
159. Id.
160. Id. The Danforth court also noted that other states have recognized an
interest in finality of state convictions. Id.
161. Id. (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989)). The court also
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court further explained that the Teague standard not only supports
Minnesota’s interest in finality of criminal convictions, but is also a
162
“bright line rule.”
Finally, the supreme court explained its reasoning for rejecting
Danforth’s invitation to adopt an alternative retroactivity
163
The court first considered and rejected a return to
approach.
164
The court explained that a return to
the Linkletter-Stovall test.
Linkletter-Stovall would overburden Minnesota’s criminal justice
165
The court
system with re-litigation of old cases under new rules.
also rejected Nevada’s Colwell standard advocated by Danforth
because Colwell, according to the court, would lead to the same
166
The court
finality problems as those created by Linkletter-Stovall.
concluded by stating that cases announcing new rules under Teague
are rare not because Teague is “unyielding or unworkable,” but
167
Thus, in Danforth, Minnesota
because “such cases are rare.”
formally adopted the Teague retroactivity standard for state post168
conviction proceedings.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE DANFORTH DECISION
A. Minnesota Should “Rethink” its Retroactivity Approach
As the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized in Danforth, Teague was
not intended to limit states’ authority to grant relief in state post169
Rather, the purpose of Teague was to
conviction proceedings.
relied on the Florida Supreme Court’s reasoning that “an absence of finality casts
a cloud of tentativeness over the criminal justice system, benefiting neither the
person convicted nor society as a whole.” Id. at 498–99 (quoting Witt v. State, 387
So.2d 922, 925 (Fla. 1980)).
162. Id. at 499. But see Lasch, supra note 57, at 50–51 (suggesting that Teague
may work against finality by giving defendants an incentive to prolong their direct
appeal as long as possible in hopes that a beneficial new rule will be announced
before their conviction becomes final); see also Strauss, supra note 32, at 1222
(stating that the U.S. Supreme Court’s current retroactivity doctrine is
“incoherent” and “difficult to apply”).
163. Danforth, 761 N.W.2d at 499.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. The court also noted that no other state has followed Nevada’s Colwell
approach. Id.
167. Id. at 500. The court appeared to agree that Teague is a strict rule, but
nonetheless believed that “eventually there may be a new rule” that will apply
retroactively under Teague. Id.
168. Id.
169. Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1041 (2008).
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address the goals of federal habeas review and minimize federal
170
Thus, Teague has
interference with state criminal convictions.
“no bearing on whether States could provide broader relief in their
171
own post-conviction proceedings than required by that opinion.”
The Minnesota Supreme Court agreed that federal habeas
concerns are irrelevant for the purposes of state post-conviction
172
proceedings. However, the court refused to abandon Teague due
to its concern for finality and fear of a major disruption in the state
173
While the court’s reasoning adequately
criminal justice system.
addresses the State’s interest in finality, it completely neglects
another important state interest—to correct “miscarriages of
174
justice.”
One purpose of state post-conviction proceedings, which is
nonexistent in federal habeas review, is to provide an “initial
175
forum” for raising and litigating various constitutional violations.
It is during state post-conviction proceedings—not federal habeas
review—that issues of innocence and fairness of proceedings are
176
By focusing solely on finality, the Minnesota
initially litigated.
Supreme Court ignored the “liberty-ensuring” function of state
177
In other words, the Minnesota Supreme
post-conviction review.
Court failed to “weigh the importance” of finality against other
state interests, such as fairness and accuracy of convictions, as was
178
suggested by the U.S. Supreme Court in Danforth. To ensure that
Minnesota’s retroactivity doctrine serves the needs of Minnesota’s
post-conviction review, the Minnesota Supreme Court should adopt
a less stringent test than Teague, one that will allow the goals of state
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1039.
172. Danforth, 761 N.W.2d at 498. “[W]e acknowledge that one of the policy
concerns underlying Teague–that federal habeas courts not excessively interfere
with state courts–is absent when a state court is reviewing state convictions . . . .”
Id.
173. Id. at 498–500. Although the court expressed great concern for the
possibility of never-ending litigation under Linkletter, it failed to provide a single
example of any such major disruptions during the twenty-seven years that Linkletter
was in force in Minnesota. See id. at 495–96.
174. Hutton, supra note 1, at 444 (discussing state postconviction remedies).
175. Lasch, supra note 57, at 44 (discussing state postconviction remedies).
176. See Hutton, supra note 1, at 441 (discussing state postconviction
remedies).
177. See id. “For the states to parrot the federal courts’ focus on finality and
waste of resources as reasons not to afford careful scrutiny in the postconviction
setting is incongruous.” Id. at 443 (footnotes omitted).
178. See Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1041 (2008).
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179

B. Review of Alternatives to Teague
Having determined that Teague is too restrictive for state postconviction proceedings, the next question is what retroactivity test
180
One of
the Minnesota Supreme Court should adopt in its place.
the easiest options is to simply return to the pre-Linkletter, common
181
law approach of automatic retroactivity.
In 1969, only four years after the Court’s decision in Linkletter,
Professor Haddad urged the Court to abandon Linkletter and return
182
to the common law approach of automatic retroactivity. Haddad
argued that Linkletter was incorrectly decided, departed from
precedent, and discriminated between similarly situated
183
Because Haddad was responding to the Court’s
defendants.
decision in Linkletter, his argument was only targeted at the U.S.
Supreme Court, not state courts addressing state post-conviction
184
However, judging by his concluding remarks, it
challenges.
appears that Professor Haddad believed that prospective-only
application of new rules of constitutional criminal procedure
185
should never have been an option anywhere in the country.
Professor Haddad’s suggestion to return to the common law
approach of automatic retroactivity has recently been renewed, but
aims specifically at state courts in state post-conviction
186
proceedings.
In his detailed analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Danforth, Professor Lasch urges state courts to adopt the standard
of automatic retroactivity of new rules of constitutional criminal
187
In his article, Lasch argues that unlike the Teague
procedure.
approach, full retroactivity of new rules offers several benefits for
179. See Hutton, supra note 1, at 457 (discussing states’ reaction to Teague).
180. See id. at 451.
181. See id. at 440–41.
182. Id. Although Haddad published his article twenty years prior to the
Court’s decision in Teague, his proposal to return to the common law approach of
automatic retroactivity is still an available option today.
183. Id.
184. See id.
185. See id. at 441 (“‘Non-retroactivity’ should be banished from the
constitutional criminal procedure scene.”).
186. See infra notes 190-99 and accompanying text.
187. Lasch, supra note 57, at 43 (“Among the various options [of retroactivity
standards] from which state courts may choose, full retroactivity is far and away the
best choice . . . .”).
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188

the states.
For example, Lasch points out that certain claims,
such as “ineffective assistance of counsel” and government’s failure
to share exculpatory evidence, are almost always litigated on post189
By adopting the
conviction review rather than on direct review.
Teague retroactivity standard, state courts forego an opportunity to
participate in the doctrinal development of certain constitutional
claims, and, as a result, leave the U.S. Supreme Court as the sole
190
By
authority for the development of this area of the law.
returning to full retroactivity, on the other hand, state courts would
not only play a direct role in the development of post-conviction
remedies, but also advocate for and protect state interests by
191
influencing the development of federal constitutional law.
Additionally, Professor Lasch argues that a return to full
retroactivity would eliminate the problem of inequality, which
192
Teague addressed but did not fully resolve. As Lasch explains, the
Teague retroactivity doctrine still discriminates between defendants
whose cases are on direct review and those whose cases are on
193
For example, two codefendants convicted on
collateral review.
the same day may be treated differently under Teague simply
because one codefendant happened to finalize his direct review
194
Lasch concludes that states can
process faster than the other.
easily avoid such “accidents of time” by abandoning Teague and
returning to full retroactivity of new rules of constitutional criminal
195
Thus, as demonstrated above, one option available
procedure.
for the Minnesota Supreme Court to consider is a return to the
196
common law approach of automatic retroactivity.
Writing four years after the Court’s decision in Teague,
188. See infra notes 193–99 and accompanying text.
189. Lasch, supra note 57, at 51.
190. Id. at 52.
191. Id. at 52–53.
192. Id. at 48.
193. Id. at 48–49.
194. Id. at 49. Lasch provides an even more striking hypothetical by
comparing two codefendants, one of whom appeals his conviction based on a
frivolous claim, while the other does not file an appeal at all. Id. at 50–51. If a
new rule is announced after the conviction of the latter becomes final, but while
the conviction of the former is still on direct appeal, only the defendant who
abused the appellate process will benefit from the new rule. Id. Such a result
conflicts with the states’ interest in finality of convictions by giving litigants an
incentive to prolong their litigation in hopes that a new, favorable rule will be
announced while their case is still on direct review. See id.
195. Id.
196. See supra notes 183–198 and accompanying text.
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Professor Hutton suggested two other alternatives, or retroactivity
197
standards, that states may consider as replacements for Teague.
One of these alternatives is the return to the Linkletter-Stovall
198
Hutton admits that the Linkletter-Stovall approach
approach.
199
leads to disparate treatment of similarly situated defendants.
Nonetheless, she argues that the Linkletter-Stovall retroactivity
standard, unlike Teague, allows state courts to focus on protection
and enforcement of constitutional rights, which is the purpose of
200
state post-conviction proceedings.
The second alternative proposed by Professor Hutton is a
201
Under this
“pure prospectivity/retroactivity” approach.
approach, new rules of constitutional criminal procedure would be
applied either to all defendants challenging their convictions or to
202
As Hutton explains, this approach has its risks and
none at all.
203
benefits. If new rules are applied retroactively to every defendant
challenging his conviction, all defendants would be treated
similarly, and the timing of a particular defendant’s appeal process
204
would not dictate whether he should benefit from the new rule.
While pure retroactivity will eliminate the arbitrary discrimination
205
between defendants, it carries the risk of disturbing the states’
criminal justice systems each time a new rule of constitutional
206
criminal procedure is announced.
Pure prospectivity, on the other hand, will dissuade defendants
from challenging their convictions on constitutional grounds
because, even if successful, they will not benefit from the new
207
Additionally, prospective application of new rules is
rule.
inconsistent with the purpose of state post-conviction review
because it allows for continued incarceration of defendants whose
208
convictions were based on constitutional violations. Nonetheless,
197. Hutton, supra note 1, at 451–57.
198. Id. at 452–55.
199. Id. at 454.
200. Id. at 454.
201. Id. at 455–57.
202. Id. at 455.
203. Id. at 455–57.
204. Id. at 456. This is also one of the arguments made by Justice Black in his
dissenting opinion in Linkletter v. Walker. 381 U.S. 618, 642 (1965) (Black, J.,
dissenting); see also supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
205. See infra note 207 and accompanying text.
206. Hutton, supra note 1, at 457.
207. Id. at 456.
208. Id.
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the
Linkletter-Stovall
approach
and
the
“pure
prospectivity/retroactivity” approach are two more alternatives that
the Minnesota Supreme Court may adopt to replace Teague.
Another alternative to the Teague retroactivity standard was
209
In
adopted by the Nevada Supreme Court in Colwell v. State.
Colwell, the Nevada Supreme Court considered whether it should
adopt Teague or an alternative approach for determining the
210
retroactivity of new rules of constitutional criminal procedure.
211
Unlike the Minnesota Supreme Court in Danforth, the Nevada
Supreme Court concluded that Teague is not binding on Nevada
212
and ultimately
courts in state post-conviction proceedings
213
rejected the strict application of Teague.
In its analysis, the Colwell court reviewed the retroactivity
approach set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Teague, observing
214
that the Teague retroactivity rule is “sound in principle.”
However, the Colwell court also emphasized that the policy
considerations responsible for the Court’s decision in Teague,
including finality of convictions, are only partially relevant to state
215
courts’ task of addressing state post-conviction challenges.
Additionally, the Colwell court observed that the U.S. Supreme
Court has applied Teague so narrowly that new rules of
216
constitutional procedure are rarely applied on collateral review.
Having made these determinations, the Colwell court decided to
217
retain Teague, but with significant modifications.
These modifications involved broadening the scope of Teague’s
218
As such, under Colwell, new rules of
two exceptions.
constitutional criminal procedure will apply retroactively if the case
falls under one of the following two exceptions: “(1) if the rule
209. 59 P.3d 463 (Nev. 2002).
210. Id. at 469–72.
211. Danforth v. State, 718 N.W.2d 451, 454 (Minn. 2006).
212. The Colwell court explained that besides the minimum protections
offered by the two exceptions in Teague, Teague is not binding on Nevada state
courts. Colwell, 59 P.3d at 470. “[W]e are free to choose the degree of retroactivity
or prospectivity which we believe appropriate to the particular rule under
consideration, so long as we give federal constitutional rights at least as broad a
scope as the United States Supreme Court requires.” Id. at 471 (quoting State v.
Fair, 502 P.2d 1150, 1152 (Or. 1972)) (quotations omitted).
213. Id. at 472.
214. Id. at 471.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 472.
218. Id. at 471–72.
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establishes that it is unconstitutional to proscribe certain conduct
as criminal or to impose a type of punishment on certain
defendants because of their status or offense; or (2) if it establishes
a procedure without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction
219
Colwell’s first exception is broader than
is seriously diminished.”
Teague’s first exception in that it is not limited to cases involving
220
“primary, private individual” conduct. Colwell’s second exception
is also broader than Teague’s second exception in that it does not
221
As such,
require the new rule to be of “watershed” significance.
Colwell’s second exception will allow retroactive application of a
new rule if the new rule has a significant impact on the accuracy of
222
Having set out this modified
a defendant’s trial and conviction.
version of Teague as Nevada’s new retroactivity doctrine, the Colwell
court stated the new approach will be both “fair and
223
straightforward.”
As explained above, the Minnesota Supreme Court has a
224
variety of alternatives that can be adopted in Teague’s place. One
option is to return to the common law approach of automatic
225
Two other available approaches are the Linkletterretroactivity.
Stovall standard or Hutton’s “pure prospectivity/retroactivity”
226
Finally, another available alternative is Colwell’s
approach.
227
As outlined below, the Minnesota
modified Teague standard.
Supreme Court should adopt Colwell’s modified Teague standard
because it is responsive to both finality and accuracy of convictions,
228
and, therefore, is a fair and balanced approach.
C. Colwell’s Modified Version of Teague is the Best Alternative for
Minnesota
From the options available, Colwell’s modified Teague standard
is the best approach for Minnesota because it would allow for an
equal balance between Minnesota’s interest in finality of
convictions on the one hand and fairness and accuracy of criminal
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id. at 472.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 183–226 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 183–200 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 201–212 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 213–227 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 233–240 and accompanying text.
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proceedings on the other. First, Colwell’s approach would address
229
and, if
Minnesota’s interest in finality of state convictions
applied, would uphold the integrity of Minnesota’s criminal justice
system. As the Colwell court explained, the modified Teague
approach incorporates Teague’s main rule that new rules of
constitutional criminal procedure would generally not be applied
230
As such,
retroactively in state post-conviction proceedings.
Colwell’s modified Teague rule would not cause any major
disruptions in Minnesota’s criminal justice system, as was feared by
231
Contrary to
the Minnesota Supreme Court majority in Danforth.
the Danforth court’s fears, new rules of constitutional criminal
procedure would not necessarily be frequently announced, and,
even when announced, would not necessarily be applied
232
retroactively.
Additionally, the modified Teague rule would not lead to
inconsistent results, as was the case with Linkletter-Stovall, because
the Minnesota Supreme Court could apply the modified Teague
rule in a consistent manner and provide lower courts with guidance
in a relatively short period of time. Colwell’s modified version of
Teague would be beneficial to Minnesota’s interest in finality of
criminal convictions and would uphold the integrity of the state
criminal justice system.
In addition to addressing finality of convictions, Colwell’s
modified Teague approach would also address and improve the
fairness and accuracy of criminal proceedings in Minnesota.
Colwell’s major modification of the original Teague rule is that it
233
Most
broadens the scope of Teague’s two exceptions.
importantly, Colwell does away with the “watershed” rule
234
requirement necessary for retroactive application under Teague.
The Colwell approach allows courts to simply determine whether a
new rule has a significant impact on the accuracy and reliability of a
trial rather than concerning themselves with whether the rule
229. Danforth v. State, 761 N.W.2d 493, 498 (Minn. 2009) (stating that finality
of convictions is an important state interest).
230. Colwell v. State, 59 P.3d 463, 471–73 (2002) (adopting the general
framework of Teague).
231. See Danforth, 761 N.W.2d at 501 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (stating that
Colwell’s modified version of Teague would not have an adverse effect on the state
criminal justice system).
232. See Colwell, 59 P.3d at 473 (finding that the rule in question in Colwell’s
case was new, but would not be given retroactive effect).
233. Id. at 472.
234. Id.
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235

qualifies as “watershed.”
By focusing on accuracy, Minnesota
courts would be addressing the fairness of trials and innocence of
criminal defendants, and, as a result, be furthering the goals and
236
Since Teague was
purpose of Minnesota’s post-conviction review.
not designed to further such state objectives, Minnesota’s current
retroactivity doctrine does not adequately address these important
state interests. Because Colwell’s modified version of Teague allows
for a healthy balance between the competing interests of finality
and fairness, it is the best retroactivity approach for the State of
Minnesota.
V. CONCLUSION
The federal retroactivity doctrine has undergone some major
changes during the last half of the twentieth century. While the
current federal retroactivity doctrine was designed specifically to
address federal interests and applications, the Minnesota Supreme
Court has adopted the federal approach and, most recently,
rejected the U.S. Supreme Court’s invitation to adopt an approach
that best suits state goals and objectives. In formally adopting the
Teague retroactivity standard for state post-conviction proceedings,
the Minnesota Supreme Court neglected to address the important
state interests of fairness and accuracy of state criminal convictions.
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s focus on finality and its decision
to formally adopt Teague will most likely preclude retroactive
application of new rules to most, if not all, cases on state post237
To create a healthy balance between the
conviction review.
competing interests of fairness and finality of convictions, and to
allow the goals of state post-conviction review to be accomplished,
the Minnesota Supreme Court should rethink its retroactivity
approach and replace Teague with a more balanced test that
adequately addresses all of these important state interests.

235. See id. (“[I]f accuracy is seriously diminished without the rule, the rule is
significant enough to warrant retroactive application.”).
236. See Hutton, supra note 1, at 441 (discussing state postconviction
remedies).
237. See Danforth v. State, 761 N.W.2d 493, 500–02 (Minn. 2009) (Anderson,
J., dissenting). Justice Anderson acknowledged the criticism that “the Teague rule
has been applied so strictly by the U.S. Supreme Court ‘that decisions defining a
constitutional safeguard rarely merit application on collateral review.’” Id.
(quoting Colwell, 59 P.3d at 471).
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